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Abstract 
The first part of this dissertation examines the impact of financial development on 
different countries holdings of U.S securities. The difference between the US weight in the 
global market capitalization and the US weight in developed and developing countries is tested 
through a panel data analysis. We find that most countries tend to overweight their US debt 
portfolio which is strongly related to their financial market development. When holdings of US 
debts and equity are low, financial market development is high; in developing countries, holding 
less US equity in their portfolio causes country to get better financial development. In developed 
countries there is no causation effect; a simple negative relation between financial development 
and countries holding of US securities is observed and countries tend to hold relatively less US 
securities through years. 
The second part of this dissertation examines whether economic conditions, affect carve-
outs frequency and returns. This paper  investigates the effect of  expansion and recession, and 
industry sectors on carve out issued in the US over 1982 to 2009. We find that the number of 
carve-outs is higher in expansion than recession. However, the cumulative abnormal returns are 
higher during recession which is explained by the higher adverse selection during this period. 
Further, we find that the difference of abnormal returns between expansion and recession is 
significant and we also observe that high-tech or non-high-tech industries that undertake carve-
out have positive higher abnormal return during recession. Therefore, within a same industry 
sector, carve-out abnormal returns are impacted by the economy cycle. However difference of 
abnormal returns between industry sector, high-tech and non-high-tech industries, is not 
significant.  
 
Key words: Developing countries; global portfolio; portfolio weights; financial market 
development; carve-outs; divestiture; business cycle. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Economic environment has always been a major factor in countries and firms decisions. 
Expansion and recession determine firm’s choices when it comes to decide when they have to 
sell their assets. In addition, economic environment affect countries financial development which 
in its turn may impact the whole country’s level of investment in other countries. The recent 
trend of liberalization and opening of borders barriers have brought a change in the global 
portfolio weights.  Investors from developing and developed countries can hold more diversified 
portfolio leading to a change in their portfolio weights. The United States securities are held by 
diverse countries due to their trade relation. However, difference between the weight of US 
security hold by a country and the weight of the US security hold in the global market exists and 
can be explained by the cost of investing in the US relative to investing elsewhere. Some 
countries tend to overweight or underweight US securities in their portfolio. 
Previous studies1investigate the cause of this opposite flow and shows that a country’s 
financial development is a factor that affects its investment in the US equity and debt’s market. 
However no research has been done on the causality effect between countries investment in the 
US and their financial growth. Given that a country cost of investment is determined by its 
financial market development, the first research question in this dissertation investigate the 
causality between developed and non-developed countries’  holding of the US securities and 
their financial market development . In addition I study whether financial market development 
and time can explain the narrowing of the difference between the US weights in each country 
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and in the global market portfolio. A panel data methodology is used to controls for country-
specific effects and accounts for the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
The second research question in this dissertation examines the difference of carve-out 
outcome in expansion and recession. Carve-out is technically an IPO; however, economically it 
is a sale of the remaining asset to public shareholders as opposed to a single buyer, where the 
parent firm typically remains a controlling shareholder after the offering (Allen and McConnell 
(1998)). 
Empirical evidence of parent firm managers' motives for an equity carve-out is sparse. 
Previous studies have found that carve-out is a firm specific problem (Agency problem, 
information asymmetry). This paper intends to add a comprehensive analysis of the equity carve-
out decision. Unlike previous studies, the analysis focuses on the economic cycle on firm 
decision not on the firm specific factors. This is because firm specific factors such as size, 
leverage, growth opportunities may be determined by the nature of economic environment. 
Carve-out varying with business cycle helps managers timing better the period of using 
carve-outs given their objective sought by doing a carveout. Firms do carve out to raise money to 
take advantage of future growth opportunity or to redistribute it to shareholder maximizing 
shareholder gains at the same time. Studying the impact of expansion and recession on carve-
outs frequency and returns becomes relevant in the decision making process. 
I compare the returns from carve-out during recession and expansion and study if the 
difference in returns is significant. Based on the results of this empirical research, I can set up the 
response of carveout given recession or expansion and this is an additional factor contributing to 
the decision taken by firms to divest using a specific method. In addition, after subdividing firms 
3 
 
in two different industry sectors which are high-tech industry and non-high tech industry, light 
can be shed on the impact of the industry sector on firms’ abnormal returns after a carve-out. 
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Chapter 2 
Impact of financial market development on holdings of U.S. assets 
1. Introduction 
The United States’ investment in emerging countries has been an ongoing topic over the 
last few decades. However, the debate about why emerging countries invest in the U.S. has not 
been deeply developed in the literature. Recent data trend from the U.S. treasury department 
shows a consistent increase of foreign holdings of U.S. securities. Forbes (2010) investigates the 
cause of this puzzling opposite flow and shows that a country’s financial development is a factor 
that affects its investment in the U.S. equity and debt market. Countries with less developed 
financial markets invest a large share of their portfolio in the U.S.. Despite the crisis of 2007-
2008, Treasury department data show a consistent increase of emerging countries holding of U.S. 
and other countries securities (2008-2011). 
Understanding the impact of financial market development on countries holdings of 
foreign assets requires a comprehension of the concept of liberalization, financial and trade 
openness2. Liberalization has started to be a common strategy in developing countries in 1980. 
Researchers investigated the benefit of opening barriers towards foreign market and it has been 
found that institution reforms are the foundation of all growth. Baltagi, Demetriades, Law (2009) 
address the empirical question of whether trade and financial openness can help explain the 
recent step in financial development, as well as its variation across countries in recent years. 
They provide evidence which suggests that both types of openness are statistically significant 
determinants of financial market development. Countries experiencing financial development 
can hold foreign asset in their portfolio due to the financial and trade openness. 
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If investors are mean-variance optimizers in a world of perfect financial markets, they 
should hold the world market portfolio. Countries that desire to optimize their portfolio return 
should hold a diversified portfolio represented as the world market portfolio. However, literature 
shows that countries investors are not close to holding the world market portfolio. The literature3 
includes barriers to international investment, departures from purchasing power parity, and 
information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors as an explanation to the bias. 
Some countries tend to overweight or underweight U.S. securities in their portfolio. Previous 
studies show that developing countries purchase U.S. instruments because of their limited 
instruments available in their own economies. Mendoza et al. (2006) find that countries with less 
developed financial systems accumulate foreign assets in countries with more advanced financial 
markets, in order to receive positive factor payments in case those countries have a negative net 
foreign asset position. Several papers, however, have argued that the relationship between 
financial market development and foreign portfolio investment may be positive instead of 
negative. For example, Martin and Rey (2004) develop a model that focuses on transactional 
frictions in asset markets and predict that larger countries will have deeper domestic equity 
markets and hold more foreign assets. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) find evidence that 
countries with more developed stock markets tend to have larger foreign equity holdings and 
argue that barriers to international investments may fall as countries develop more financial 
market sophistication in their domestic markets. Forbes (2010) investigates foreign countries 
holdings of U.S. assets. She determines a negative relationship between holdings of U.S. and 
financial development. Using a cross-sectional time series FGLS estimators she finds that 
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foreigners hold greater shares of their investment portfolios in the United States if they have less 
developed home financial markets, fewer capital controls and greater trade with the U.S.. 
My paper develops in details the findings in Forbes (2010) and introduces a deeper 
explanation of financial market development impact on a country’s holdings of U.S. assets. I use 
simultaneous equations on panel data to present empirical evidence of the effect of holdings of 
U.S. assets on financial market development. The first goal of this research is to examine the 
causality between countries’ financial market development and the difference between the U.S. 
weight in the global market and the U.S. weight in countries’ portfolis. Secondly, it is to examine 
whether time effect can explain the narrowing of the deviation of U.S. weight in countries from 
the U.S. weight in the global market. 
The results reported below on causality between financial market development and U.S. 
weight in countries are based on two samples divided into developed and developing countries; 
Analysis on the causality between the two factors for developed and developing country 
constitutes the most important contribution in this paper. Previous researchers show that 
financial development impact countries’ investment in the U.S. based on their correlation and 
using one sample. However no study has been done on the causality between financial market 
development and countries holdings of U.S. assets. 
After conducting a cross country analysis for holdings of U.S. equity and debt in 
countries portfolio, I found as in previous literature4 that countries tend to overweight their U.S. 
debts while they underweight their U.S. equity. The deviation of U.S. securities held by a 
country from the U.S. securities held in the global market is computed and is explained by 
countries financial market development. This paper has three main findings. Firstly, this paper 
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finds that holding less U.S. equity would lead to a better financial market. Secondly, in 
developed countries no causality link is found between financial market development and 
holdings of U.S. assets. Thirdly, for developing countries the weight of the U.S. equity in their 
portfolio impacts negatively their financial market development. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 is a literature review on why 
countries invest in the U.S. and the theories on global CAPM. Section 3 presents hypotheses. 
Section 4 explains the data and methodology followed in this paper. Section 5 describes the 
results. Section 6 presents the conclusion. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Why countries invest in the U.S. 
The reasons why foreign countries invest in the U.S. are sparse. One of the main reasons 
is trade between countries. Recent trade liberalization episodes in developing countries 
especially Latin America involved primarily drastic reductions in tariff barriers, making trade 
with the U.S. and other countries less costly. Trade deficit encountered by countries leads to 
capital account surplus which is an evidence of a country's net foreign assets increase. 
Forbes (2010) reveals that there is strong evidence countries that trade more with the 
United States invest relatively more of their portfolios in U.S. equity and debt markets, and 
countries with fewer capital controls invest relatively more in U.S. equity markets. By 
investigating why foreigners invest in the U.S., she also finds that foreigners do not invest more 
in U.S. markets if their returns in their own markets are less correlated with the United States. 
This provides little support for a diversification motive for foreign investment. On the contrary, 
the size, liquidity, and overall attractiveness of U.S. financial markets have been significant 
factors determining patterns of foreign investment in the United States. Even though the recent 
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financial crisis has showed serious weaknesses in U.S. financial markets, U.S. Treasuries, 
especially short-term U.S. T-Bills, were perceived by many investors to be the safest and most 
liquid investment during this tumultuous period. Therefore many foreign countries still invest in 
the U.S. securities. 
Gain from diversification is also one of the reason countries can invest in the U.S.. The 
diversification dimension refers to the increase in foreign assets and liabilities in countries’ 
portfolios. Foreign countries prefer investing in assets with lower volatility and U.S. securities 
are good targets in that case (Gourinchas and Ray (2007); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)). 
Domestic residents invest more abroad and foreigners increase their investments at home, 
generating more cross-border holdings. Different authors use, alternatively, net capital flows, 
grosses capital flows, and country portfolios as measures of financial globalization. In theory, 
this process allows risk to be diversified more efficiently and provides opportunities for 
exploiting cross-border risk-adjusted return differentials, effectively exercising pressure to 
equalize returns across countries and instruments. In addition to enhancing the efficiency of 
resource allocation, increased financial diversification might play an important role in the 
development of local capital markets. It can enhance liquidity, boost research, improve the 
quantity and quality of information, increase transparency, and promote better corporate 
governance practices, thereby reducing agency problems. Low correlation between national 
stock markets is often presented as evidence in support of the benefit of global portfolio 
diversification (Levy and Sarnat (1970)). Because of their low correlation with each other and 
with developed stock market, emerging stock markets are attractive portfolio diversification 
prospects for global investors (Ratner and Leal, 1996). Historically the U.S. does not offer high 
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returns however market is less volatile than emerging markets counterparts. This stability in their 
market maintains U.S. assets attractive. 
Despite these positive effects, financial diversification might also have its downside and 
countries investments in the U.S. are less determined by their diversification motive. Over the 
years, volatile capital flows have led to more extreme booms and busts. In particular, surges in 
capital inflows to countries with shallow domestic financial markets and a limited menu of 
financial assets can generate systemic problems. Increased diversification of financial systems 
can also be associated with a greater exposure to external crises through the financial channel. 
Hedging is also cited as a reason and a benefit for investing in the U.S.. Exchange rate 
variations over time are a potential source of risk to cross-border financial obligations and trade-
related transactions. Concerns about the potentially disruptive financial and real consequences of 
such variations are reflected in the policy of some countries to explicitly limit the nominal 
variability of their currency vis-à-vis that of others. While this anxiety of floating is the result of 
a complicated array of competing considerations, it nonetheless illustrates that limiting exchange 
rate variability ranks well ahead of other policy objectives in some countries. Hedging then 
becomes one of the reasons that lead investor to invest in the U.S. giving benefits to equity 
investments in the short term by dampening currency fluctuations. Dooley et al. (2003) argue 
that foreign governments purchase U.S. assets to maintain undervalued exchange rates and to 
accumulate highly liquid, low-risk reserve assets. 
Private companies in countries may hold a mix of hedged and speculative positions in 
response to his expectations concerning absolute price changes is a practice used by some firms. 
In the former the tendency, as illustrated by Keynes' “normal backwardation,” is much more to 
10 
 
speak of the hedger and the speculator as if they were entirely separate individuals with entirely 
different motivations. 
Another argument explaining why foreigners hold U.S. assets is their financial markets. 
Countries’ level of financial development defines their amount of investment in other countries. 
Caballero et al. (2008) developed a model in which high-growth economies generate a demand 
for saving instruments. The limited instruments available in their own economies lead them to 
purchase U.S. instruments. For Mendoza et al. (2006) countries with less developed financial 
systems accumulate foreign assets in countries with more advanced financial markets, in order 
for countries with negative net foreign asset positions to receive positive factor payments. In 
related work that does not explicitly focus on global imbalances, Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
(2006) develop a model in which emerging market economies have significant growth potential 
but limited domestic financial instruments, generating capital flows to developed economies and 
bubbles in emerging markets. Ju and Wei (2006) find that a poor country with an inefficient 
financial system may simultaneously experience an outflow of financial capital but an inflow of 
FDI, resulting in a small net flow. Data, based on the literature, confirm the growing investments 
flows towards the United States. 
2.2 Theory on Global CAPM 
As cited in the previous sections, many financial and economic reasons explain foreign 
investments in the U.S. However, the importance of the U.S. securities in foreign markets differs, 
giving each country’s market efficiency. Global CAPM states that if markets are efficient and 
cross border barriers to invest are small, and if investors focus only on the mean and variance of 
the real return, then investors should hold the global value weighted portfolio with each weight 
reflecting size of U.S. securities in each countries capital market. I define the U.S. weight in the 
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world market portfolio, Wus as the ratio of the U.S. market value divided by the global market 
capitalization. The U.S. weight in country i, Wi,U.S. is also defined as the ratio of country i U.S. 
security market value divided by its total portfolio holdings. In this paper I subdivide U.S. assets 
hold by foreigners into its two main components: Equity and debt. The weight of the U.S. debt in 
country i, Wi,usd is defined as the ratio of country i U.S. debt market value divided by its total 
debt holdings. The weight of the U.S. equity in country i, Wi,use is defined as the ratio of country 
i U.S. equity market value divided by its total equity holdings. Global CAPM states then that the 
weight of the U.S. assets in a country i must be proportional to the weight of the U.S. assets in 
the global market. However, imbalances5 are noticed and two different cases can be observed: 
Overweighting or underweighting U.S. assets. Previous literatures show that most countries 
overweight their U.S. debt portfolio while they tend to underweight U.S. equity in their portfolio. 
There are possible factors explaining the portfolio imbalance. Forbes (2010) reveals that 
there is strong evidence that countries that trade more with the United States invest relatively 
more of their portfolios in U.S. equity and debt markets, and countries with fewer capital 
controls invest relatively more in U.S. equity markets. Foreigners do not invest more in U.S. 
markets if returns in their own markets are less correlated with the United States. 
Holding everything else equal, countries with higher cost of investing in the U.S. relative 
to investing elsewhere will tend to have lower shares of the U.S. assets in their portfolio. 
Therefore, countries invest more in the U.S. if they have a higher relative cost of investing in 
their country. Given that cost of investment is associated to countries financial development 
level, lower cost of investing in one’s own countries and many other countries is a sign of a 
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 Obstfeld,Maurice, Rogoff, Kenneth,(2007). 
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country financial development. Therefore, there is a negative relationship between a country 
financial market development and its investment in the U.S. (Forbes (2010)) 
However, some other researchers find a positive relation between financial market 
development and their foreign holdings. Martin and Rey (2004), based on several other papers 
that argue that the relationship between financial market development and foreign portfolio 
investment may be positive instead of negative, focus on transactional frictions in asset markets 
and predict that larger countries will have deeper domestic equity markets and hold more foreign 
assets. 
3. Hypothesis 
According to neo-classical theory, developing countries tend to be net importers of 
capital in the long run and as countries gradually liberalise financial flows, capital should flow 
from advanced countries towards developing countries, until the additional investment in capital 
in these countries equalises the marginal returns on capital between countries. However, for most 
of the past thirty years, the opposite has been true with net capital flowing into the advanced 
economies. Lucas (1990) showed that the mechanism described by neo-classical theory did not 
correspond to the observed data. The Lucas “paradox”6 is based on the observation that, over the 
long term, financial flows tend to flow towards the rich countries. This phenomenon, which 
accelerated in the first half of the 2000s, may be partially explained by the relatively higher level 
of financial development in the advanced economies. Understood as the capacity of an 
institutional framework to reduce the informational frictions and transaction costs weighing on 
contract formation, financial development could also help to explain the composition of the 
external asset portfolios of different countries. It is then obvious that the capital account 
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 Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff.( 2004). 
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liberalisation speeds up financial development which will influence the share of developed 
countries ‘equity and debt in the developing countries’ portfolio and vice versa. 
From the previous literature7countries tend to overweight their U.S. assets, however when 
their financial market improves countries will hold less U.S. equities in countries’ portfolio. In 
another side, holding less U.S. assets may cause financial market development in the sense that 
the results are greater efficiencies in allocating capital because you invest less in the U.S. and 
invest more in other different countries. Risk sharing and less overweighting compared to the 
global market portfolio are also the results from a better financial market development. 
Therefore, the impact of a country’s financial market development on its investment in the 
United States remains an empirical question, and I test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Financial market development causes holdings of U.S. equity and debt. 
Hypothesis 2: Holdings of U.S. equity and debt cause financial market development. 
Given that financial market development explains the evolution of countries’ portfolio 
weight; I can deduct that financial development also explaining the difference between the 
weight of U.S. in countries’ portfolio and the weight of U.S. in the global market. Based on 
global CAPM, countries should hold global portfolio and the gap should narrow with time. This 
means that overweighing countries should reduce their U.S. asset with time. This happens within 
country and through time. It’s a process and Forbes (2010) finds that the magnitude of the 
difference between countries and global market holdings U.S. assets decreases with income per 
capita. Given that countries’ income per capita8 increases through years, financial market may 
improve while the magnitude may decrease; therefore, I present the following hypothesis: 
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 Forbes,(2010) 
8
 Keith Sill (2008) 
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Hypothesis 3: Financial market development predicts the narrowing of the difference 
between the weights of the U.S. securities in countries and global market’s portfolio. 
4. Methodology and data 
4.1 Data 
In order to compute countries’ portfolio weight in the U.S. equity and debt markets, I use 
data from the report on foreign portfolio holdings of U.S. securities, compiled by the IMF, the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the World Bank. I 
choose 42 countries that represent the main investors in the U.S. from the U.S. Treasury 
Department9. IMF data which are free of custodial bias include private sector but not official 
sector10. Data range is from 2001 to 2010 which includes the worst financial crisis since the great 
depression of 1930. The following represents the main variables used in this paper. Their 
descriptions include the formula used and the source of the data. 
Wiusd represents the weight of U.S. debt in country i total debt portfolio. It is defined as the ratio 
of holding of U.S. debt in country i divided by the total holding of debt in country i. 
Wiuse corresponds to the weight of U.S. equity in country i total equity portfolio. It is defined as 
the ratio of holding of U.S. equity in country i divided by the total holding of equity in country i. 
Wusd characterize the weight of U.S. debt in the global debt market. It is defined as the ratio of 
holdings of U.S. debt in global debt market divided by the total debt holdings in the global 
market. 
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 Countries invested more than 5000 million in the US. 
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 Datasets include investment by government-sponsored investment funds that do not constitute official reserve 
holdings like sovereign wealth and pension funds 
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Wuse represent the weight of U.S. equity in the global equity market. It is defined as the ratio of 
holdings of U.S. equity in global debt market divided by the total equity holdings in the global 
market. 
DEVusd is the difference between U.S. debt weight in countries and U.S. debt weight in the 
global market; DEVusd=Wiusd-Wusd. 
DEVuse corresponds to the difference between U.S. equity weight in countries and U.S. equity 
weight in the global market and defined as DEVuse=Wiuse-Wuse. 
FMD represents the financial market development .Many papers used different proxies for the 
financial market but in this paper, I use the stock market capitalization to GDP which is also used 
in Forbes (2010). It represents the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage 
of GDP. Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by the value of 
GDP, all in current U.S. dollars. Those data are from International Monetary Fund, balance of 
Payments Statistics Yearbook and World Bank. 
dGDP is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices and is based constant 2000 
U.S. dollars. 
FX which represents the real exchange rates data are taken from the United States Department of 
Agriculture. Real historical exchange rates are calculated from nominal exchange rates and CPIs 
using for Baseline Countries (2005 base year); it measures the cost of foreign goods relative to 
domestic goods. It gives a measure of competitiveness. 
4.2 Methodology 
Using panel data methodology, I run simultaneous equations with fixed effect model to 
investigate the relationship between financial market development and the deviation from global 
market holding of U.S. portfolio within the countries. In this model, countries hold U.S. equity 
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and debt and the deviation of each country from the global market will be investigated separately 
according to the type of assets (equity and debt). 
DEV,  	
  	,  	,  	FMD,  		,	 ,  	!",  #  $2001 ( $2008  *   ,1-FMD,  .
  .,  .,  .DEV,  .	,. ,  .!",  /  $2001 ( $2008  0  ,2- 1 
Where DEVi,t represent deviation of country i portfolio from the global market in year t; 
DEVi,t is later on divided in DEVusdi,t or DEVusei,t to represent respectively the deviation of 
country i holdings of U.S. debt and equity from the global market in year t. FMD, trade, dGDP
 
and FX represents the independent variable, ak and bk is the coefficient for independent variables, 
k=1to 6; uit and γi are error terms and γi and Ɵi are fixed time invariant. The year dummy 
variable, Y2001-Y2008, is used in the equations in order to incorporate the effect of time on the 
deviation in each country’s holding of U.S. equity or debt. 
One potential issue with those equations is endogeneity with the measures of financial 
development. More specifically, the measure of financial market development for the base equity 
and debt regressions, respectively are components of the calculation of U.S. weight in countries. 
To address this problem in the equity regressions, I use the three stage least square estimator. 
One of the three-stage least squares advantage is that the model does not have to be completely 
specified.  I use lagged dependent variables to test causality. 
The two first hypotheses stated in section 3 are tested as following: 
• First hypothesis: We test DEV causes FMD if . is significant and 	 is not. 
• Second hypothesis: We test FMD causes DEV if 	 is significant and . is not. 
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5. Empirical Evidence 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for GDP growth, trade, foreign exchange rate, 
financial market development, the U.S. debt and equity market value as a fraction of countries’ 
total portfolio holdings, and the deviation in each country’s holdings of U.S. equity and debt 
from the world market portfolio based on IMF data. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents a descriptive statistics of the weight of U.S. debt and equity in countries 
portfolio and the different variable that can impact those weights. Data are based on IMF-CPIS. 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
wiuse 420 0.261 0.214 0.000 0.919 
wiusd 420 0.300 0.235 0.000 0.945 
devuse 420 -0.041 0.214 -0.315 0.614 
devusd 420 0.214 0.235 -0.093 0.873 
Fmd 420 0.734 0.545 0.035 2.916 
Fx 420 1.853 2.372 -0.710 9.470 
Dgdp 420 3.442 3.583 -10.894 14.763 
Trade 420 0.222 0.289 0.038 2.003 
 
Table 2 presents a cross sectional mean summary of all the 42 countries from 2001 to 2010. 
FMD (Financial market development) has been increasing for all years except 2008 which 
reveals the financial crisis the world went through. On average, countries overweight their U.S. 
portfolio of debt by 21.61% and underweight their U.S. portfolio of equity by 3.83%. However 
from 2001 to 2010 countries reduced progressively their overweighing in U.S. debt portfolio 
which led to a decrease in DEVusd. In another term, countries have a tendency to hold the global 
market portfolio. My results are consistent with Forbes (2010) who finds that the mean foreign 
holdings of U.S. equities were 4.3% of countries portfolio while U.S. equities were 36% of 
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global market equity. In another way, countries put less weight in their U.S. equities. Carol C. 
Bertaut and Linda S. Kole.2004 find that the portfolios of non-U.S. investors underweight U.S. 
equities to a greater extent than the equities of other regions, usually by a considerable margin. In 
spite of apparent U.S. advantages, non-U.S. investors in fact are less likely to hold the optimal 
weight of U.S. equities. This can be explained by a role for regional preferences or informational 
advantages that lead foreign investors to weight more heavily close-proximity foreign stocks, 
and for foreign investors, these advantages more than offset the benefits conferred by U.S. 
disclosure and governance requirements. 
Figure 1 shows that along with the increase of FMD, a decrease of the difference between 
the U.S. debt in countries and global market’s portfolio has been observed. In another term, 
through years, countries tend to hold the global market portfolio. 
Table 2: Cross sectional summary 
 
year wiuse wiusd Devuse devusd Trade dGDP FX FMD 
2001 0.281 0.360 -0.032 0.268 0.208 2.476 2.050 0.680 
2002 0.263 0.336 -0.027 0.243 0.203 2.767 2.044 0.587 
2003 0.266 0.334 -0.034 0.246 0.201 3.458 1.946 0.610 
2004 0.274 0.301 -0.021 0.219 0.214 5.038 1.880 0.690 
2005 0.268 0.295 -0.048 0.211 0.220 4.480 1.849 0.751 
2006 0.246 0.294 -0.060 0.206 0.227 5.302 1.830 0.855 
2007 0.234 0.268 -0.076 0.179 0.236 5.414 1.754 0.982 
2008 0.252 0.263 -0.032 0.190 0.242 2.648 1.702 0.771 
2009 0.252 0.271 -0.044 0.188 0.231 -1.828 1.757 0.637 
2010 0.271 0.273 -0.034 0.188 0.237 4.661 1.713 0.779 
Total 
Average 0.261 0.300 -0.041 0.214 0.222 3.442 1.852 0.734 
 
This table gives a cross sectional summary of the variables. Value are obtained using a weighted average of all the 
42 countries 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Wusd: the U.S. debt market value as a fraction of total global debt market capitalization 
Wiusd: the U.S. debt market value as a fraction of total debt portfolio holdings by investors from the ith country. 
The Graph shows how countries in average tend to hold the global market portfolio 
Table 3 describes a time series of each of the 42 countries’ financial market development, 
trade, foreign exchange rate, GDP growth. It also shows the deviation of countries holding the 
U.S. debt in their portfolio from the global market holding of the U.S. securities in its portfolio. 
Panel A shows a sample of 23 developed countries with in high-income countries, on average 
between 2001 and 2010, countries overweight the U.S. debt in their total debt portfolio and the 
overweigh degrees varies across countries with a variance of 0.031. U.S. equity is however 
underweight by 4.3%. Financial market development (FMD), trade, GDP growth and FX also 
vary across countries. Their variance is respectively 0.265, 0.136, 1.577 and 3.457. Switzerland 
has the highest FMD and at the same time shows a low degree of U.S. securities overweighing. 
Panel B examined 19 developing countries. DEVusd and DEVuse have a variance respectively 
equals to 0.054 and 0.049. As in developed countries, FMD, trade, dGDP and FX in developing 
countries vary considerably across countries. My results are consistent with Forbes (2010) 
0
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findings that there is substantial variation in different countries’ exposure to U.S. equity and debt 
and foreign exposure to U.S. debt markets also tends to be greater than that for equity markets. 
However, this paper show a clearer pattern based on developed and developing countries. It is 
important to notice that developing countries overweight much more (30%) their U.S. securities 
in their portfolio than developed countries do (14%).Developing countries also shows on average 
lower financial development, higher GDP growth and foreign exchange rate. Argentina is the 
country that overweighs the most U.S. securities and this may be due to their dollarization. My 
findings are also consistent with Caballero et al. (2006) the demand for U.S. assets is driven by a 
shortage of safe assets in developing economies. It becomes evident that developing countries 
will overweight more the U.S. assets than developed countries. 
.
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Table 3: Time series summary 
Time series (2001-2010) summary for each of the 42 countries studied (yearly data) 
 
DEVuse DEVusd Trade dGDP FX FMD 
 µ(%) µ(%) µ(%) µ(%) µ(%) µ(%) 
Panel A: Developed countries 
Australia 0.212 0.346 0.091 3.055 0.317 1.135 
Austria -0.164 -0.011 0.235 1.568 -0.188 0.283 
Belgium -0.226 -0.009 0.319 1.405 -0.189 0.660 
Canada 0.219 0.565 0.108 1.889 0.217 1.116 
Czech republic -0.229 -0.001 0.176 3.441 3.159 0.248 
Denmark -0.032 0.080 0.329 0.595 1.815 0.623 
Finland -0.168 -0.036 0.181 1.859 -0.203 1.065 
France -0.166 0.007 0.108 1.122 -0.185 0.812 
Germany -0.186 0.003 0.138 0.961 -0.192 0.464 
Ireland -0.035 0.187 0.712 2.477 -0.193 0.488 
Israel 0.418 0.520 0.212 3.130 1.426 0.805 
Italy -0.220 0.042 0.102 0.397 -0.188 0.397 
Japan 0.153 0.234 0.053 0.775 4.702 0.778 
Luxembourg -0.096 0.069 1.734 2.774 -0.192 1.601 
Netherlands 0.081 0.073 0.239 1.389 -0.185 0.943 
New Zealand 0.072 0.286 0.147 2.354 0.478 0.361 
Norway -0.020 0.109 0.196 1.517 1.893 0.529 
Singapore -0.134 0.073 0.899 5.726 0.450 1.795 
South Korea -0.053 0.426 0.146 4.525 7.026 0.684 
Spain -0.205 -0.009 0.148 2.095 -0.190 0.845 
Sweden -0.027 0.150 0.216 2.160 2.046 1.024 
Switzerland -0.139 0.037 0.201 1.678 0.235 2.380 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
United kingdom -0.046 0.173 0.168 1.706 -0.532 1.275 
Mean, Developed countries -0.043 0.144 0.298 2.113 0.927 0.883 
Variance, Developed countries 0.028 0.031 0.136 1.577 3.457 0.265 
Panel B: Developing countries 
Argentina 0.471 0.846 0.075 4.563 1.001 0.383 
Brazil -0.062 0.268 0.046 3.641 0.860 0.504 
Chile -0.001 0.411 0.123 3.900 6.336 1.006 
China -0.247 0.132 0.065 10.490 2.034 0.637 
Colombia 0.269 0.667 0.051 4.094 7.733 0.298 
Egypt -0.287 0.321 0.227 4.858 1.603 0.521 
India -0.144 0.014 0.115 7.468 3.762 0.608 
Indonesia -0.195 0.091 0.099 5.233 9.115 0.262 
Kazakhstan 0.132 0.464 0.153 8.330 4.853 0.215 
Malaysia -0.167 0.087 0.296 4.651 1.271 1.327 
Mexico 0.225 0.590 0.042 1.816 2.395 0.261 
Panama -0.047 0.428 0.315 6.397 -0.033 0.275 
Philippines 0.332 0.460 0.110 4.778 3.905 0.441 
Poland -0.198 0.131 0.113 3.914 1.187 0.266 
Romania -0.275 0.034 0.109 4.435 1.125 0.143 
Russia -0.181 0.209 0.088 4.909 3.353 0.544 
South Africa -0.163 0.204 0.096 3.531 1.980 2.002 
Thailand -0.182 0.215 0.260 4.368 3.626 0.572 
Turkey -0.002 0.096 0.082 4.580 0.369 0.260 
Mean, Developing countries -0.038 0.298 0.130 5.050 2.972 0.554 
Variance, Developing countries 0.049 0.0536 0.007 3.773 6.391 0.207 
Mean, All -0.041 0.214 0.222 3.442 1.852 0.734 
For each country, I report the mean (µ) for DEVusd, DEVuse, FMD, trade, dGDP, and FX. Units are ratios. Panel A summarizes result for developed countries, 
whereas panel B summarizes results for developing countries. 
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5.2 Results panel regression 
5.2.1 Financial Development and holdings of U.S. debt 
Using fixed effect model, table 4 reports evidence of the causality between the financial 
market development and the deviation in each country’s holdings of U.S. debt from the world 
market portfolio. The table is divided in three samples representing the different types of 
countries studied.  Columns 1 and 2 report the results for 23 developed countries while column 3 
and 4 reports results for 19 developing countries. Column 5 and 6 show the results for all the 
42countries, developing and developed. 
Table 4: Fixed effect (FMD and DEVusd)  
This table reports the fixed-effect as well as the adjusted heteroskedasticity (White) p value. The asterisk *, **, and 
*** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.  FMD and DEVusd are dependent variables while their lags 
represent independent variables. The table is divided in three samples representing the different types of countries 
studied.  Columns 1 and 2 report the results for 23 developed countries while column 3 and 4 reports results for 19 
developing countries. Column 5 and 6 show the results for all the 42countriesdeveloping and developed. First test: 
DEV causes FMD if . is significant and 	 is not. Second test: FMD causes DEV if 	 is significant and . is not. 
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 .,  .23,  .	,. ,  .!",  /  $0   ,2-1 
 Panel A: Developed countries   Panel B: Developing countries  All countries 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
FMD 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
DEVusd 
  Dependent 
Variable: 
FMD 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
DEVusd 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
FMD 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
DEVusd 
Variables (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
DEVusd(-1) 
0.280 
 
0.447*** 
 
0.116 0.398*** 0.280 0.446*** 
(0.413) (0.000) (0.160) (0.000) (0.413) (0.000) 
DEVusd -0.739** 
 -  
 -0.091* 
 - 
 -0.739**  - 
(0.019) (0.059)  (0.019)   
FMD 
-  
-0.037** 
 
 
-  
-0.084*  -  -0.057** 
(0.020) (0.079)    (0.012) 
FMD(-1) 0.522*** 
 
-0.025 
 
 0.622*** 
 
0.016  0.522***  0.035** 
(0.00) (0.110) (0.000) (0.807)  (0.000)  (0.041) 
Trade 0.738** 
 
0.077* 
 
 0.980 
 
-1.154*  0.738***  0.090** 
(0.029) (0.085) (0.196) (0.080)  (0.028)  (0.053) 
dGDP 0.038*** 
 
0.13E-02 
 
 -0.85E-02 
 
0.39E-02*  0.039***  0.2E-02* 
(0.000) (0.199) (0.191) (0.096)  (0.000)  (0.078) 
FX -0.222*** 
 
0.011 
 
 -0.225*** 
 
0.042  -0.222***  0.6E-02 
(0.002) (0.781) (0.008) (0.570)  (0.002)  (0.876) 
             
Adjusted R2 0.94  0.97   0.94  0.81  0.95  0.86 
Number of 
observations 207  207  
 
171  171 
 
378 
 
378 
Note: three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation is done on a system of two equations for developed and non-
developed countries. 
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For developed countries, coefficient b1and α2 are not significant which lead us to 
conclude to an absence of causality between financial market development and holdings of U.S. 
Financial market development does not cause a decrease in holdings of U.S. debts; also, holding 
less U.S. debts does not cause a financial market development in developed countries. 
For developing countries, table 4 shows no causality between FMD and DEVusd. 
Coefficients b1 and α2 from column 2 and 3 are not significant. Therefore as for developed 
countries, financial market development does not cause a decrease in holdings of U.S. debts and 
holding less U.S. debts does not cause a financial market development in developed countries. 
However, while considering the whole sample developed and developing countries, the 
countries’ financial market development is found to be negatively related to country’s holding of 
the U.S. debt. Coefficient b1 becomes not significant while α2 becomes significant. FMD causes 
DEVusd. Over all, table 4 shows evidence that financial market development causes deviation 
from holding U.S. debt. FMD leads to holding more U.S. debts. This finding is consistent with 
Martin and Rey (2004) that predict that larger countries will have deeper domestic equity 
markets and hold more foreign assets. It is also consistent with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2008)that  find evidence that countries with more developed stock markets tend to have larger 
foreign equity holdings and argue that barriers to international investments may fall as countries 
develop more financial market sophistication in their domestic markets. 
The other independent variables, trade and Dgdp in column 5 are all positive. Coefficient 
of trade is positive and significant. This suggests that in overall, countries that trade more also 
tend to invest more in the U.S. debt. 
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5.2.2 Financial Development and holdings of U.S. equity 
Moving from the debt market to the equity market, table 4 shows variables that impact 
financial market development and the deviation in each country’s holdings of U.S. equity from 
the world market portfolio based on IMF data. 
Using the same model, table 5 investigates more on the causality effect between financial 
development and country’s holding of U.S. equity. The table is divided in three samples 
representing the different types of countries studied.  Columns 1 and 2 report the results for 23 
developed countries while column 3 and 4 reports results for 19 developing countries. Column 5 
and 6 show the results for all the 42countriesdeveloping and developed. 
Table 5: Fixed effect (FMD and DEVuse) 
Note: This table reports the fixed-effect as well as the adjusted heteroskedasticity (White) p value. The asterisk *, **, 
and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.  FMD and DEVuse. The table is divided in three samples 
representing the different types of countries studied.  Columns 1 and 2 report the results for 23 developed countries 
while column 3 and 4 reports results for 19 developing countries. Column 5 and 6 show the results for all the 
42countriesdeveloping and developed. First hypothesis:  DEV causes FMD if . is significant and 	 is not. Second 
hypothesis: Test FMD causes DEV if 	 is significant and . is not. 
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 $0  ,2-1 
 
 Panel A: Developed countries   Panel B: Developing countries  All countries 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
FMD 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
DEVuse 
  Dependent 
Variable: 
FMD 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
DEVuse 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
FMD 
 Dependent 
Variable: 
DEVuse 
Variables (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
DEVuse(-1) 0.660** 
 
0.613*** 0.155*** 0.566***  0.660** 0.615*** 
 (0.016) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)  (0.015) (0.000) 
DEVuse -1.483*** 
 -  
 -0.054 
 - 
 -1.482***  
- (0.000) (0.401)  (0.000)  
FMD 
-  
-0.067*** 
 
 
-  
-0.053  
- 
 -0.061** 
(0.000) (0.320)   (0.013) 
FMD(-1) 0.525*** 
 
0.049*** 
 
 0.623*** 
 
0.017  0.525***  0.046*** 
(0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.690)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
Trade 0.661** 
 
0.037 
 
 0.991 
 
-0.208  0.661***  0.033 
(0.039) (0.191) (0.203) (0.789)  (0.039)  (0.245) 
dGDP 0.037*** 
 
0.16E-02 
 
 -0.95E-02 
 
0.22E-02  0.037***  0.13E-02 
(0.000) (0.126) (0.149) (0.390)  (0.000)  (0.242) 
FX -0.079 
 
0.057** 
 
 -0.199*** 
 
-0.039  -0.079  0.058* 
(0.335) (0.030) (0.005) (0.583)  (0.354)  (0.031) 
             
Adjusted R2 0.95  0.97   0.94  0.78  0.95  0.83 
Number of 
observations 207  207  
 
171  171 
 
378 
 
378 
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In developed countries, Coefficient b1 and α2 are both significant. We conclude that there 
is no causality between financial market development and the deviation in each country’s 
holdings of U.S. equity from the world market portfolio. 
In developing countries, coefficient α2 is not significant while b1 is significant. This 
reveals that there is causality between FMD and DEVuse. The positive coefficient show that 
holding more US equity which means a higher deviation from world market portfolio causes 
financial market development. 
In overall, while using the whole sample, results are consistent with the ones found in 
developed countries. Coefficient α2 and b1 are both significant. This reveals that there is no 
causality between FMD and DEVuse based on our statement of the causality hypothesis. 
Table 5 shows evidence that the deviation of each country’s holding of U.S. equity from 
the world market portfolio causes financial market development in developing countries.  Reisen, 
Helmut, and Marcelo Soto (2001) find developing countries should not solely rely on national 
savings, but rather should encourage foreign direct investment and portfolio equity inflows so as 
to stimulate long-term growth prospects. My results complete their findings in a sense that 
developing countries maybe better off by encouraging capital inflow rather than portfolio equity 
outflow. 
Considering the other independent variables in the whole sample, column 5 also shows 
that the coefficient on trade and GDP growth are positive and significant. Higher GDP growth 
and higher trade amount with the world are related to higher financial development. 
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5.2.3 Results for Panel regression-Financial Market Development and the narrowing of 
difference between global and country debt portfolio’s weight 
Given the pattern found in figure 1, I assume that there are unobserved effects that vary 
across time that may impact the financial development and the deviation of each country’s 
holding of U.S. securities from the world market portfolio. If I consider that financial market 
development may impact the deviation of countries holdings from global portfolio the same way 
for each country, it may be different at different point in time. To control for such unobserved 
variable that may vary by time, I run time fixed effects regression model. The fixed time effect 
model investigates how time affects the intercept using time dummy variables. The period 
dummy controls for any periods related effects that are invariant across country. 
Table 6 shows the causality between deviation in each country’s holdings of U.S. assets 
from the world market portfolio and FMD. It reveals how time effects impact the relationship. 
We consider the whole sample 42 countries. Coefficient α2 is not significant while b1 is which 
suggest that DEVuse causes FMD. The negative coefficient shows that holding less U.S. equity 
lead to a better financial market. Time effect alters the relationship DEV 
Financial market development is caused by within country investment converging on that 
which is predicted by the global CAPM.  No causation found in debt market. Regarding to the 
time effects, table 6 shows some coefficients are significant but there is no pattern in DEV 
equation.  Convergence of DEV over time is predicted if countries are becoming more 
financially developed and that development is causing deviation in each country’s holdings of 
U.S. assets from the world market portfolio.  However, results do not reveal such convergence. 
This finding does not endorse what Forbes states as the decreasing of the difference between 
countries and global market holdings of U.S. assets. 
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Table 6: Time effect 
This table reports the fixed-effect as well as the adjusted heteroskedasticity (White) p value. The asterisk *, **, and 
*** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.  It includes period dummy variables Year2002-Year 2008 
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 $2001 ( $2008 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All countries (debt)   All countries (equity)  
 
Dependent 
Variable: FMD 
 
Dependent 
Variable: DEVusd 
  
Dependent 
Variable: FMD 
 
Dependent 
Variable: DEVuse 
 
Variables (1)  (2)   (5)  (6)  
DEVuse(-1) 
-  - 
 
-0.351*** 
 
0.710***  
 (0.042) (0.000)  
DEVuse 
-  -  
 -0.084 
 - 
 
(0.661)  
DEVusd -0.149  
- 
  
- 
 
- 
 
(0.474)      
DEVusd(-1) 0.192  0.349***   
- 
 
- 
 
(0.677)  (0.000)     
FMD 
-  
-0.034 
 
 
-  
-0.4E-02  
(0.361) (0.896)  
FMD(-1) 0.564*** 
 
0.038 
 
 0.551*** 
 
0.010  
(0.00) (0.190) (0.000) (0.653)  
Trade 0.638** 
 
0.145*** 
 
 0.623** 
 
-0.026  
(0.046) (0.003) (0.051) (0.474)  
dGDP 0.029*** 
 
0.17E-02 
 
 0.028*** 
 
0.17E-02  
(0.000) (0.282) (0.000) (0.227)  
FX -0.085 
 
-0.127 
 
 -0.046 
 
-0.135**  
(0.466) (0.119) (0.712) (0.040)  
Year 2002 0.029*  0.050   -0.061  -0.029  
 (0.081)  (0.116)   (0.132)  (0.234)  
Year 2003 0.011*  0.052***   0.69E-02  -0.029  
 (0.092)  (0.009)   (0.848)  (0.137)  
Year 2004 0.57E-02  0.017   0.024  -0.56E-02  
 (0.393)  (0.253)   (0.455)  (0.810)  
Year 2005 0.46E-03  0.20   0.026  -0.036*  
 (0.973)  (0.263)   (0.360)  (0.073)  
Year 2006 
-0.14E-02  0.014   0.073***  -0.030  
 (0.861)  (0.575)   (0.007)  (0.164)  
Year 2007 
-0.58E-02  -0.016   0.120***  -0.030  
 (0.518)  (0.474)   (0.000)  (0.249)  
Year 2008 0.019***  -0.24E-02   -0.119***  -0.035  
 (0.004)  (0.895)   (0.000))  (0.133)  
     
 
   
 
Adjusted R2 0.95  0.88   0.96  0.83  
Number of 
observations 378  378  
 
378  378 
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5.2.4 Shortcomings 
There is no clear conclusion based on table 4, 5 and 6 regarding the causality between 
FMD and DEV. This threat to conclusion validity is a factor that can lead to reach an incorrect 
conclusion about causality between FMD and DEV in our observations. I can essentially make 
two kinds of errors about relationships: conclude that there is no relationship when in fact there 
is or conclude that there is a relationship when in fact there is not. The most likely is the first 
one. The threat to conclusion validity that tends to take into account the strength of the signal, 
the amount of information we collected, and the amount of risk we take in making the decision 
about whether a causality exists is called low statistical power. Therefore, our results may be 
biased due to possible low power which is caused by our limited time series data. 
Low statistical power increases the probability of type II error, which reduces the 
probability of detecting a difference between groups, where a difference exists. Paradoxically, 
low statistical power also increases the likelihood that a statistically significant finding is 
actually falsely positive for a given p-value11. 
Another potential issue in this chapter may be the measurement issue. The initial measure 
of stock market capitalization to GDP to measure financial development, but financial market 
development uses a broader set of instruments: stock market value traded to GDP, stock market 
turnover, and private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. 
There is no convergence on the perfect proxy for financial development. 
                                                 
11
 R.M Chrisley,2010 
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6. Conclusion 
My analysis based on the panel data methodology reveals that holdings less U.S. equity 
causes a financial market development in developing countries. However, in developed 
countries, there is no causality between holdings of U.S. equity and countries financial market 
development. 
The results on causality between financial market development and holdings of U.S. asset 
given that country is developed or developing are the most important contribution in this paper. 
Financial market development is caused by within country investment converging on.  Results 
also showed no causation in debt market Results and also show that there is no convergence with 
time. 
The causality between countries’ financial market development and their holding of U.S. 
assets observed in this study can be expanded to other countries than just the U.S. In addition, 
Levine (2003) reported a very strong positive correlation between stock market development and 
economic growth. Further studies can be realized by investigating the causality between U.S. 
holdings and economic growth.  Another related implication is that as countries around the world 
develop and strengthen their own financial markets, they will hold less U.S. securities; and if 
countries with less developed financial markets begin to question the relative advantages of U.S. 
financial markets, this could lead to a more rapid adjustment in U.S. capital inflows, global 
imbalances and asset prices. 
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Chapter 3 
Equity carve-outs and macroeconomic activity 
1. Introduction 
The debate about whether and how economic or environment conditions affect 
divestitures is ongoing. Researchers in finance contended that divestitures can be a reaction to 
shock in the general environment12. Macroeconomic factors affect cash flows, firms’ type and 
quality of investment opportunity set, and the perception of risk13; therefore, they are able to 
capture the variation of firms’ returns and can be considered as an explanation in companies’ 
returns before, during and after a divestiture. Previous literatures have examined the motivation 
of divestiture on an idiosyncratic form and they shed a light on the positive abnormal return after 
a divestiture. John and Ofek (1995) find that there is a positive relationship between the 
improvement of the firms operating performance and the seller stocks’ returns at the divestiture 
announcement. Elimination of negative synergies, improvements in focus, or tax and regulatory 
considerations have been defined as motives for divestitures in general. 
On the other side, Slovin, Sushka and Ferarro (1995) investigated differentiation between 
divesture methods and why firms choose one method and not the other. They studied the 
information conveyed by the different types of divestiture and they found that managers choose 
equity carve-outs when outside investors are likely to price the new shares higher than managers’ 
perceived value. One of the findings of Krishnaswami and Subramanian (1999) shows the 
difference between divestiture is also based on the firm information asymmetry level. They 
                                                 
12
 Ito,1985; Rose and Ito (2005) 
13
 Interest rates, industry performance and economic growth. 
34 
 
found that the market reaction around the announcement of divestiture is positive and the value 
gains at the divestiture announcement is higher when higher is the information asymmetry prior 
to divestiture. 
Divestiture, as a central topic of research in several areas has been then defined as a 
practice to create value and it has numerous sources of explanation as information asymmetry, 
correction of previous bad acquisition. Information asymmetry on divestiture has been well 
documented. However, what is the power of business and economic cycle on divestiture outcome 
explanation? So far, few macroeconomic variables have been used in the analysis of the different 
types of divestiture. Moschieri and Mair (2008), in their synthesis about corporate divestiture, 
stated for example that it is still not clear whether divestitures are merely a reflection of 
economic cycle, a mean to correct or reverse previous strategic decisions, or a proactive strategic 
option. Therefore, it can be interesting to know if beyond the firm specific problem, the 
macroeconomic situation can have an impact on the higher returns of divested firms and how 
those idiosyncratic variables can impact different type of divestitures like carve out. 
Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) show that business cycle affects equity offerings and a 
larger number of firms issue common stock and the proportion of external financing accounted 
for by equity is substantially higher in expansionary phases of the business cycle. Equity carve-
outs are initial public offerings of subsidiary equity and they generate cash for the parent firm 
through a public sale of equity that has a claim only to the carved-out unit’s cash flows. 
Investigating the occurrence of a relation between divestiture and economic cycles can be 
a contribution to the managerial team of enterprises. In this dissertation, I focus on the relation 
between business cycle and carve-outs which are a specific type of divestiture. The economy 
factors such as economic growth, industry performance and the level of information asymmetry 
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in the market capture the change in firms’ abnormal returns around carve out announcement 
because those economy factors affect the firms’ investment opportunities and investor sentiment. 
Therefore, variables impacting carve out abnormal return are influenced by economic cycle and 
can lead to variation in divestitures abnormal return. Companies do carve out to raise cash and 
increase the performance of the firm. This study is based on Chloe, Masulis and Nanda paper on 
business cycle and equity offerings and it investigates more specifically how economic cycle 
may affect differently carve out and given the results I can conclude how sensitive carve out 
returns react to expansion and recession. 
I compare the returns from carve out during recession and expansion and study if the 
difference in returns are significant. Based on the results of this empirical research, I can set up 
the response of carveout given recessions or expansions and this is an additional factor 
contributing to the decision taken by firms to divest using a specific method. In addition, after 
subdividing firms in two different industry sectors which are high tech industry and non-high 
tech industry, light can be shed on the impact of the industry sector on firms abnormal returns 
after a carve out. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 studies summary of previous 
researches done on carve-outs and economic factors. Section 3 develops testable hypothesis. 
Section 4 describes the data and the methodology. Section 5 provides the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Literature review 
Divestiture refers to an alteration of the firm’s productive portfolio and many literatures 
have been done concerning the types of divestitures, motivation, and abnormal return around the 
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divestiture event. 14Several authors examined how companies divest, in attempt to throw more 
light on the different mode of divesting. Explanation of divestiture has been also mostly 
explained by the agency explanation. Agency theory explains the antecedents, process, and 
outcomes of divestitures and theorists believe that the reason why many companies undertake a 
divestiture has to do with issues between managers, owners and the board of directors. 
Divestitures are also viewed as a correction for prior inefficient growth and diversification 
strategy pursued by managers (Jensen, 1986). Managers decide to undertake a divestiture only 
when they fear the threat of an acquisition or are pressured by shareholders (Bethel and 
Liebeskind, 1993). 
Powers (2001) investigates factors influencing divestitures. He finds first that financial 
need can be a motivation in case the parent is in need of external capital and other sources of that 
external capital is likely hard to access. Lang, Poulsen and Slutz (1995) argue that firms sell 
assets when doing so provide the cheapest source of fund. The second motivation of Powers is 
the necessity to focus in order to have a value increasing in parent’s firm. Managerial and 
prospective price, selloffs and carveouts should be more likely when what management believes 
is the intrinsic value of the assets equal or is less than after tax proceeds. Spinoffs however are 
more likely to occur when assets are perceived by management to be undervalued. Hand and 
Skantz (1997b) show that carveouts should be more likely after periods of strong market returns 
and in industries that outperform the market. Spinoffs are expected to be more likely in industries 
that underperform the market. Based on those results we can oversee that the economic 
environment can contribute to increase or decrease returns around a carveout. For instance the 
                                                 
14
 McGahan & Villalonga 2003; Slovin, sushka & Ferraro 1995; villalonga & Mcgahan 2005 
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stock price of a division sold to the public through an IPO (carveout) will depend on the general 
tendency of prices in the economy which are subject to cycles. 
Lowry and Schwert (2002) show, using initial return from 1960 to 2001, that high and 
rising initial returns tend to be followed by emissions of IPOs, which are themselves followed by 
periods of lower initial returns. 
Choi and Jeon investigate the impact of the macroeconomic environment on aggregate 
merger activity in the US economy from January 1980 to December 2004. They found that there 
is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the set of macroeconomic variables and measures 
of merger activity, implying that the macroeconomic factors play an important role in 
determining the trend of aggregate merger activity in the US economy. 
Given that merger and acquisition occurs according cycles in order to improve the value 
of the firms, similar behavior can be used for divestitures. Companies willing to successfully 
implement technical or organizational innovations in the pursuit of prosperity and survival will 
choose to divest according the economic environment. This attempt to explain divestiture is 
linked to companies’ business and economic cycle life. 
Yarrow and Jasinski (1996) find that the effect of business cycle on divestitures’ outcome 
has two theoretical ideas to be noted. First it is more natural to expect a divestiture after a 
recession than during the recession because of the reduced uncertainty about private profitability 
of the enterprise. Second, they might expect that the sale prices would be depressed. Their 
statement opens then another questions concerning the type of divestitures their likely to happen 
during or post-recession. 
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In response to that issue, Hand and Skantz (1997) show that the carve-out should be more 
likely after periods of strong market returns and in industries that outperform the market. This 
paper find that an evident link can be done with the macroeconomic environment surrounding 
periods of strong market returns which are expansions period. Khoroshilov (2009) for example 
found that divestiture tend to occur during economic booms. 
Given that carve-out is a type of equity offerings, Hickman (1953) and Moore (1980) 
investigate on the frequency of equity offers relative to debt offers. They find that equity offers 
increase in expansionary phases of the U.S. business cycle and decrease in the contractionary 
phases. In addition, Marsh (1982) and Taggart (1977) document that firms prefer to issue equity 
when equity prices are relatively high which are typically periods of economic expansion and to 
issue debt when debt prices are relatively high or interest rates are relatively low typically 
periods of economic contraction. 
It is well known that historically a larger number of firms issue common stock and the 
proportion of external financing accounted for by equity is substantially higher in expansionary 
phases of the business cycle. Chloe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) show that this phenomenon is 
consistent with firms selling seasoned equity when they face lower adverse selection costs, 
which occurs in periods with more promising investment opportunities and with less uncertainty 
about assets in place. However No study has been done on the impact of carve-outs outcome. 
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1 Economic growth. Investment opportunities and frequency of carve-outs 
In a growing economy, investment opportunities increase. Sellers will have more valuable uses 
for the cash they raise and buyer can put their purchases to more valuable use in economic boom. 
Recession decreases the growth opportunities available for buyers and sellers (Alexandrou, 
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Sudarsanam, 2001).In addition, because of the higher costs and the higher disclosure standards 
involved in a carve-out transaction, firms with low-quality assets or firms that are highly 
leveraged may not find the capital market accessible (Michaely et al, 1995). Chung, Li, Yu 
(2005) consider a simple model stating that initial public offering price is equal to the present 
value of an entity's assets in place and growth opportunities. They find that the initial return is 
positively related to the size of growth opportunities. Therefore, high growth opportunities firms 
will be more frequent during expansion than economic downturns. The relation between the 
frequency of carve-outs and business cycle can be then investigated15. I develop two hypotheses 
stating the relation between carve-outs and business cycle. 16 
Hypothesis 1: Carveout being a partial IPO and positively related to growth opportunity, I expect 
that carve out numbers during expansion be higher than during recession. 
My hypothesis is based on adverse selection and market timing explanations. 
• The adverse selection hypothesis. 
Business cycle and frequency patterns can be explained theoretically by a time varying 
adverse selection effect that firms using carve-outs face. In this situation, expansionary phases of 
the business cycle naturally induce weaker adverse selection effects and asymmetry information. 
Adverse selection effect is caused by the managers’ efforts to maximize shareholder wealth by 
avoiding equity offers when the stock is substantially underpriced (Myers-Majluf 84). 
                                                 
15
 Previous study finds existence of that. Carveout objective make it related to economic cycle. Hickman (1953) and Moore 
(1980) investigate on the frequency of equity offers relative to debt offers. They find that equity offers increase in expansionary 
phases of the U.S. business cycle and decrease in the contractionary phases. Marsh (1982) and Taggart (1977) document that 
firms prefer to issue equity when equity prices are relatively high which are typically periods of economic expansion and to issue 
debt when debt prices are relatively high or interest rates are relatively low typically periods of economic contraction. 
  
16
 Based on Choe, Nanda and Masulis hypothesis stating number of equity offerings and its abnormal return vary across business 
cycle 
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There is less adverse information revealed about the firm type at an equity announcement 
in a better economic state. In recessions, the adverse selection effect rises because the 
profitability of new investment falls while uncertainty concerning the value of assets in place 
rises. (Chloe et al) 
Since expansions are associated with periods having more profitable investment 
opportunities and greater values for assets in place, hypothesis 1 can be interpreted as predicting 
that equity offers in recession involve higher adverse selection effects. In that situation, good 
firms know their securities are undervalued and will not sell them. However, bad firms know 
their securities are overpriced and would love to sell. The only firms willing to sell will be the 
bad firms, therefore investors will not invest in firms and the number of carveout during 
economic downturn will be lower than the number in expansion. 
Empirical research by Lowry and Schwert documents that stock price volatility varies 
over the business cycle, increasing during recessions. They link this volatility increase to 
increases in operating leverage; a condition which is to likely to be positively related to investor 
uncertainty regarding the value of firm assets in place. It follows that in economic downturns the 
uncertainty concerning the value of assets in place increases. Adverse selection effect of an 
equity offer falls in expansion and rises in downturns due to changes in uncertainty about the 
value of assets in place. Several prior studies have found evidence supportive of hypothesis 1 
where several proxies for market uncertainty about the value of firm assets in place have been 
used including Tobin’s Q ratio. 
• The market timing hypothesis 
The market timing hypothesis argues that the motivation for the transaction is to take 
advantage of temporarily overvalued equity on an individual firm level or on the industry level 
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(Baker and Wurgler (2002)). Equity securities are issued when their respective market values are 
relatively high. This argument relies on equity being issued when expected profits are especially 
high which causes stock prices to be relatively high. It is motivated by the prior empirical work 
of Marsh and Taggart and the observation that corporate managers desire to time security 
offerings to minimize the firm’s cost of capital. An empirical prediction of this argument is that 
there are relatively more equity issues following stock market price rises. 
a. Information asymmetry, investment opportunities, carve out abnormal returns 
Announcement returns for equity carve-outs were first studied by Schipper and Smith 
(1986). For their sample of 76 carve-out announcements by U.S. parent firms between 1965 and 
1983 they found a 1.8 percent abnormal positive return for the -4 to 0 day window relative to the 
announcement. These results have since then been confirmed by numerous studies for the U.S. 
(e.g. Allen and McConnell (1998) 
In my study, I subdivide the carve-out in expansion and recession to investigate the 
impact of business cycle on carve-outs abnormal returns. Since economic booms are associated 
with periods having more profitable investment opportunities and greater values for assets in 
place, this involves smaller adverse selection effects and I can settle the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Carveout being a partial IPO and IPO abnormal returns being related to adverse 
selection (information asymmetry), I expect to have lower abnormal return during expansion 
(lower adverse selection) than during recession. 
The intuition here is that the more valuable the investment opportunity and assets in 
place, the more likely it is that a firm will be willing to bear the adverse selection costs 
associated with an equity issue. Since more types of firms will be willing to issue equity in 
periods with more profitable investment opportunities, less adverse information is released by 
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the announcement of a carve-out. The positive price reaction is further diminished by the greater 
likelihood of carve-out when the market previously knows that the firm has more profitable 
investment opportunities. 
The value of investment opportunities and assets will then affect both the number of 
firms issuing equity as well as the market’s reaction to a carve-out announcement. I will expect 
market reaction to carveout during expansion to be lower given that the value of Tobin’s Q is 
high and adverse selection effect is low. In addition, given that carve-out is typically an IPO, 
SEC requirement are more pronounced and even strict during recession than expansion. 
Therefore abnormal returns in recession are higher than in expansion. Few firms do carve-out in 
recession; however when they do it they are able to get a higher positive returns. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are then different across the business cycle: It indicates that 
factors affecting the signal around carveout announcement are different depending on the 
economic environment. 
In a booming economy, there is a greater optimism about the future growth opportunities 
and Ambarish et al. (1987) argue that for firms where information asymmetry is primary about 
the future investment opportunities rather than the asset in place, new security issues signal 
positive information about the value of the growth opportunities. They found a positive relation 
between growth opportunities and the abnormal return. Chloe, Masulis, Nanda, 1993 shows 
periods with more promising opportunities and less uncertainty about existing asset sales 
(Expansion phases of business cycles) naturally induce weaker adverse selection effect and better 
buyers(fit hypothesis). I can therefore argue that information asymmetry is negatively related to 
growth opportunities; carve-out numbers during low information asymmetry will be higher than 
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high information asymmetry; however abnormal returns will be higher in recession than 
expansion. 
3.3 Investor sentiment, investment opportunities, carve out returns 
Lee, Jiang and Indro (2002) incorporate both bullish and bearish sentiments into their 
model and find that investor sentiment causes a shock in both the formation of conditional 
volatility and expected returns approved from three market indices, namely, DJIA, S&P500, and 
NASDAQ. When a bull market is booming, the market window for new corporate offerings 
tends to open and these new offerings enjoy bursts of popularity. In a declining market, however, 
the market window tends to close and IPO activity slows down and may even come to a stop 
(Ritter, 1991). Carveout being a partial IPO and IPO returns being positively related to investor 
sentiment, I expect that the number of carve out returns during high investor sentiment be higher 
than during low investor sentiment. 
3.4 High tech industries, investment opportunities, carve out returns 
In a growing national product, high-tech industries have higher investment opportunities 
than non-high-tech industries. In addition, firms that divest will have more valuable uses for the 
cash they raise and buyer can put their purchases to more valuable use in economic boom. High 
tech industries play a prominent role in the current economy. Based on the type of industry firm 
belongs, some characteristics can be quickly drawn. Open to date, high technology industries 
have been seen as open innovation concepts draw the attention of many investors. Investors have 
demonstrated a lot of optimism about the future growth of technology based company. High tech 
industries constitute an attractive growth opportunity for investors. 
During the last ten year high tech companies has emerged as leader in the economy. 
High-tech industries possess desirable growth opportunities which procure them less information 
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asymmetry around carve-out announcement. The increasing reliance of firms on technology and 
the evolution of the technology itself increase the industry sector competitiveness reducing the 
adverse selection. Recession decreases the growth opportunities available for buyers and sellers 
(Alexandrou, Sudarsanam, 2001) impact firm choices to raise cash through. 
Previous studies have found on average focus increasing transaction enhance shareholder 
wealth. Given that high tech industries are related with high growth opportunity and given that 
carveout which is technically an IPO produce positive abnormal returns for firm having a high 
Tobin’s Q, I expect companies that belong to high growth industry and undertake a carveout to 
have a positive lower abnormal return than firms that belong to non-high growth industries. 
In addition because less adverse selection increases during expansion, I expect that carve-out 
abnormal return from high tech industries be lower than non-high tech industry. 
Hypothesis 3: High tech industries carve-out abnormal returns are related to more profitable 
investments and less of an adverse selection effect. Given that less adverse selection increases 
during expansion, therefore, I expect that carve-out abnormal return from high tech industries be 
lower than non-high tech industry. 
Hypothesis 3 reinforces the idea that firms with high investment opportunity exhibit lower 
abnormal returns around carve-outs announcement 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Data 
The sample used in this paper includes firms that divested through carve outs during the 
period 1982-2009. The large sample is explained by the fact that the study is done on the 
economic cycle. After subdividing the sample by economic cycles, the dependent variable is 
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taken as firm’s abnormal returns around the announcement of the carveout. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using event study. 
Firm size which is considered as firm-specific control variable in our regression is 
measured as the principal amount issued relative to the total assets obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
Economic growth is measured using annual GNP growth rates, where the GNP figures 
are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
Growth opportunity is measured using the market to book ratio for each firm using the 
end of the fiscal year prior the divestment. There are multiple definitions of Market-to-Book 
ratios. One of the simplest definition is just to divide the market value of the common stock 
(price * shares outstanding) over its book value. The firm’s investment opportunities is measured 
by Tobin’s q and is calculated as, 
Tobin’s q = (market value of equity - book value of equity + total assets)/total assets 
Anticipation is proxied by Smoothed recession probabilities for the United States. Those 
probabilities are obtained from a dynamic-factor markov-switching model applied to four 
monthly coincident variables: non-farm payroll employment, the index of industrial production, 
real personal income excluding transfer payments, and real manufacturing and trade sales. 
4.2 Sample 
The initial sample of equity carve-outs is identified from SDC Platinum’s New Issues 
database and from issues of Mergers and Acquisitions magazine. I exclude carve-outs from our 
sample that were characterized by the following: financial firms, REITs, foreign firms, and joint 
ventures, lack of availability of proxy statements, occurrence of contemporaneous 
announcements, and unavailability of information on the parent in the CRSP database. Firm size, 
leverage are selected from COMPUSTAT. 
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Carve-out sample covers the divestments announced by USA public companies during 
1982-2009. The sample size is 320 carve outs where 174 made by non-high-tech industries and 
146 were made by high-tech industries (See Table 1). Carve-out has reached the pick in 
expansion 2 with 155 divestitures. Carve out frequencies has seen the pick during the period 
1991-2001. However it’s important to notice that both type of industry, high-tech and non-high-
tech industries have almost equally issued the same amount of carveouts. High tech industry 
identification is based on classification made by SDC. 
4.3 Methodology 
I subdivide the periods in recession and expansion period based on the national bureau of 
Economic Research announcement date. Contractions (Recessions) start at the peak of a business 
cycle and end at the trough. Then in each cycle, I study the abnormal returns of divestiture 
through carve outs. A t-stat test is run to check if we have a significant difference between the 
returns of these types of divestiture. 
High-tech industries and non-high-tech industry are also identified using SDC 
identification codes. I then measure the abnormal returns of the two types of industries in order 
to find any potential difference. Each industry sector is broken down to the different economic 
cycle in order to study the impact of expansion and recession on those firms’ carve-outs returns. 
Abnormal returns around the announcement of carveout are measured using the 
conventional event study methodology. I estimate a market model over a255-day period ending 
46 days before the announcement of the carve-outs; the market is proxied by the CRSP value-
weighted index. I use the filing provided by SDC and WRDS as the announcement date for the 
carve-out issues. 
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A second step of the methodology is the study of economic variables in the OLS 
regression analysis. I study the returns of firms that divest according the following variables: 
GNP growth, interest rates, and Tobin’s Q, size and market anticipation as a control variable 
5. Empirical Evidence 
5.1 Carve-out frequency and summary statistic 
Table 1 presents the distribution of carve outs from 1982-2009 and show the evidences 
for hypothesis 1. The number of carveouts during expansion outweighs the number during 
recession. 313 firms divested through carve out during expansion while just 12 done it during 
recession time. On average, we have less than one carve out per month except during expansion 
2 where more than 1 firm divested through carveout. 
Firms use more carve-outs during expansion than during contraction. Among firms that 
carve out during expansion 187 where non-high-tech industry while 118 were high-tech 
industries. Data shows that given the type of sector, firms use more carve-out during expansion 
than during economic downturns. 
The results are consistent with previous researches that found that high and rising initial 
returns tend to be followed by emissions of IPOs, which are themselves followed by periods of 
lower initial returns. In addition, it is more natural to expect a divestiture after a recession than 
during the recession because of the reduced uncertainty about private profitability of the 
enterprise which is consistent with our findings (George K Yarrow, Piotr Jasinski (1996)). 
Results are also consistent with the theory of adverse selection and market timing stated 
previously. 
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Table 1: Distribution of carve-outs from 1982-2009 
 
 
Equity carve-outs 
 
High tech companies 
 
Non high tech companies 
Economic cycle Total Number of C/month 
 
Frequency Number of C/month 
 
Frequency Number of C/month 
Expansion 1: Nov 1982-Jun 1990 
90 0.98  28 0.30  62 0.67 
Recession 1: Jul 1990- March 1991 
5 0.63  1 0.13  4 0.50 
Expansion 2: apr 1991-fev 2001 
191 1.59  77 0.64  114 0.95 
Recession 2: March 2001-Nov 2001 
6 0.75  3 0.38  3 0.38 
Expansion 3: dec 2001-nov 2007 32 0.44  9 0.12  23 0.32 
Recession 3: Dec 2007-june 2009 1 0.06  0 0.00  1 0.06 
In this table I provide the distribution of carve-outs according to industry sector and economic cycle from 1982 to 2009. I select carve-outs issued by 
American companies which have completed status. I measure upturns from trough to peak in the business cycle and downturns from peak to trough where 
troughs and peaks are classified by the NBER. The number of carve-out per month is constructed from the total number of equity carve- out from SDC 
divided by the total number of month in the cycle. 
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Table 2 and 3 presents the descriptive statistics for growth opportunities. The mean value of 
growth opportunities which are proxied by Tobin’s Q in our sample is 3.05 during expansion 
while 2.67 during recession. The median size of Tobin’s Q is 1.5 during expansion and 1.1 
during recession. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistic on opportunity growth according economic cycle 
 
     
 Mean  Median 
      
 Tobin’s Q (firms) Q ratio(Economic cycle)  Tobin’s Q Q ratio 
Economic cycle      
Expansion 1 3.00 0.497  1.95 0.510 
Recession 1 3.25 0.601  3.32 0.591 
Expansion 2 3.28 1.179  1.90 1.143 
Recession 2 1.49 1.133  1.61 1.155 
Expansion 3 1.70 0.970  1.40 0.973 
Recession 3 5.63 0.794  1 0.800 
Q which is a good proxy for economic cycle is a method of estimating the fair value of the stock market. It's defined 
as the total price of the market divided by the replacement cost of all its companies. In this table, I compare the 
opportunity growth of firms that divest and the global market opportunity growth. 
 
Table 2 and 3 indicate that firms have more growth opportunities during expansion than 
recession. Those results confirm the idea developed in the hypothesis that equity is issued when 
expected profits are especially high which causes stock prices to be relatively high. In addition, 
table 2 and 3 reveals that our sample of firms using carve-outs has a higher growth opportunity 
than the global growth opportunity in the market. The results are consistent with the fact that 
carve-out being a type of IPO, firms using carve-out have necessarily a good growth opportunity 
in order sell an equity through a public offerings. Firms have then a good Tobin’s Q compared to 
others but their Tobin’s q value is higher in expansion than in recession. 
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Table 3: Growth Opportunities across expansion and recession 
Table 3 shows growth opportunities for carve-outs firms during the business cycle. The sample size in expansion is 
313 and the one in recession is 12. Q ratio is a good proxy for economic cycle and estimates the fair value of the 
stock market. 
I subdivide the carve-out sample in the two industry sectors to study the Tobin’s Q 
related to each sector. Table 4 describes the statistics of opportunity growth in the two industry 
sectors, high tech and non-high-tech. The mean value of Tobin’s Q related to each high tech firm 
is 4.35 which are greater than the non-high-tech firms’ value 3.46. 
Table 4: Growth Opportunities across industry type 
 Mean Median 
 Tobin’s Q Q ratio Tobin’s Q Q ratio 
High tech industry 
4.35 0.88 2.31 0.97 
Non high tech industry 
3.46 0.84 3.25 0.79 
Table 4 describes the statistics of opportunity growth in the two industry sectors, high tech and non-high-tech. The 
sample size for non-high-tech firms is 174 and the sample size for high-tech industries is 146. Q ratio which is 
different from Tobin’s Q is a good proxy for economic cycle and estimates the fair value of the stock market. 
 
Table 5 describes the statistic of firm specific factors, leverage and size. In the carve-out 
sample we study that expansion is characterized by high leverage firms and small size firms. 
This is explained by the fact that carve-outs are financing opportunity of last resort at best. Firms 
resort to carve-outs because they are financially constrained; however firms that use carve-outs 
also have high opportunity growth. Leverage does not reduce growth for firms that have a high 
opportunity growth. Lang, Ofek, Stulz 1995 show that leverage is negatively related to growth 
for firms whose growth opportunities are low. Thus, given that carve-out have relatively high 
 Mean  Median 
 Tobin’s Q Q ratio  Tobin’s Q Q ratio 
Expansion 
3.05 0.88 
 
1.82 0.97 
Recession 
2.67 0.84 
 
2.10 0.79 
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opportunities growth, I can state that being financially constrained do not stop firms from having 
high opportunity growth. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistic on firm and economic characteristics 
Panel A: All  carve out 
    
 
Mean Median 
 Leverage Size Leverage Size 
Expansion 8.05% 4.71 1.79 4.48 
Recession 6.67% 5.98 3.22% 6.94 
Panel B:High-tech industry carve out     
 Mean Median 
 Leverage Size Leverage Size 
Expansion 10.06% 4.31 0.52% 4.05 
Recession 3.22% 7.71 1.61% 8.71 
Panel C:Non-High-tech industry carve out     
 Mean Median 
 Leverage Size Leverage Size 
Expansion 6.89% 4.94 3.81% 4.69 
Recession 8.64% 5.00 3.92% 5.47 
Table 5 describes the statistic of firms’ leverage and size. The table is subdivided in three samples. The first sample 
is constituted by 320 firms; the second is firms in high-tech domain 146 and the last sample is for non-high-tech 
firms 174.
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5.2 Abnormal return and regression Results 
In this section, I analyze the abnormal return during expansion and recession and I study 
the impact of firm-specific and economic factor on carve-outs abnormal return. 
I measure abnormal returns using the event study and estimating a market model over 
255-day period ending 46 days before the announcement of the carveout.  I use the CRSP value 
weighted index to proxy for the market. Panel A of table 6 summarize the abnormal returns over 
different time intervals around the filing day. I obtain a significant mean two day cumulative 
abnormal return of 2.971% in the event window (0,+1) during recession and 0.63% during 
expansion. The mean CAAR for the other entire event window during expansion are significant. 
Table7 shows standardized abnormal and along with relevant test statistics, associated with the 
121 carve-outs announcements during expansion and 5 carve-outs announcement during 
recession. Results are depicted in Figure 1. My results suggest that carve-outs announcements 
are associated with positive abnormal returns in the period preceding the announcement. 
Moreover, there appears to be a large positive abnormal return during recession than expansion. 
The impact of business cycle on carveout abnormal returns is significantly positive and 
higher during expansion than during economic downturns. These abnormal returns are very 
similar to the returns in Chloe, Masulis, Nanda, 1993 and follow the idea of having high 
abnormal return when information asymmetry is high. Recession is characterized by higher 
information asymmetry bigger firm size which leading abnormal return to be higher in recession 
than in expansion. 
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Table 6: Analysis of cumulative abnormal returns across periods of the macroeconomic 
Event window Mean (%) 
(Expansion) 
Mean (%) 
(Recession) 
Difference 
Panel A: CAAR for all firms carve outs    
(-1,0) 0.70** 5.76*** 5.08 
(1.615) (2.562) 
    
(0,1) 0.63** 2.97*** 2.34 
(1.607) (2.155) 
    
(-1,1) 1.08** 6.25*** 5.17 
(1.860) (2.455) 
    
0 0.24* 2.48*** 2.24 
(1.351) (2.401) 
The sample consists of equity carve-out during the period 1982-2009 by industrial companies in the USA. The table 
presents cumulative abnormal returns and univariate analysis of the abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market model parameters estimated over 255 days ending 46 days before the filing of the 
carve-out. The market is proxied by the CRSP value-weighted index. Standardized cross sectional test which is an 
extension of the Patel test is noted in parenthesis. The asterisk *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels. 
 
Table 7: Analysis of cumulative abnormal returns across periods of the macroeconomic 
This table presents abnormal returns and significance test statistics for a sample of 171 divestitures over the period 
January 1982through November 2009. 
Event date AR recession 
z statistic for AR 
recession AR expansion 
z statistic 
for AR 
expansion 
-30 -2.03% -1.854 -0.05% 0.764 
-29 -0.40% -0.279 0.10% 0.036 
-28 1.09% 1.158 -0.05% 0.764 
-27 1.54% 0.82 -0.23% -1.784 
-26 0.29% 0.127 -0.10% -1.966 
-25 -0.83% -2.673 0.19% 1.31 
-24 -1.74% -0.778 -0.75% -1.238 
-23 1.24% 0.878 -0.56% -1.966 
-22 -0.40% -0.659 0.63% 1.492 
-21 -3.36% -1.257 0.62% 1.128 
-20 -2.10% -1.298 0.08% 0.036 
-19 -0.96% -1.756 0.04% 0.582 
-18 -1.02% -0.386 -0.05% -0.51 
-17 0.47% 0.778 -0.11% 0.4 
-16 1.82% 1.737 0.15% -0.146 
-15 1.02% 0.998 -0.14% 0.764 
-14 -2.72% -1.307 0.06% 0.036 
-13 -2.09% -2.079 -0.15% -0.692 
-12 -0.11% -0.504 0.15% 1.31 
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Table 7( Contined) 
-11 1.10% 2.013 -0.50% -0.874 
-10 1.03% 0.934 -0.36% -2.148 
-9 0.67% 0.174 0.01% -0.328 
-8 4.17% 2.305 -0.57% -0.146 
-7 4.56% 3.421 0.14% 0.4 
-6 2.85% 1.424 -0.32% -1.966 
-5 0.01% -0.372 -0.25% -0.146 
-4 -0.99% -0.116 -0.19% -0.874 
-3 -0.55% -0.735 -0.29% -1.784 
-2 1.47% 1.243 0.42% -0.51 
-1 3.28% 1.533 0.46% -0.692 
0 2.48% 3.401 0.24% 0.946 
1 0.49% 0.748 0.39% 0.218 
2 0.51% 0.8 0.46% 1.31 
3 0.57% 0.184 0.31% -0.328 
4 2.19% 1.128 0.91% -0.51 
5 -0.69% -0.848 -0.08% 0.218 
6 -3.75% -1.38 0.83% 1.31 
7 2.12% 0.624 -0.51% -1.056 
8 -1.43% -1.719 -0.44% -0.146 
9 -1.45% -1.611 0.30% 0.946 
10 -0.85% -0.705 0.75% 0.946 
11 0.56% 2.138 0.06% 0.036 
12 -1.00% -1.125 -0.14% 0.4 
13 0.27% 0.358 0.55% 1.674 
14 0.88% 0.654 0.28% -0.328 
15 0.02% -0.594 -0.04% -0.51 
16 1.25% 1.271 0.12% 1.674 
17 1.35% 1.476 -0.05% 0.764 
18 1.44% 1.68 -0.21% 0.218 
19 1.84% 0.412 -0.25% 0.582 
20 -0.30% -0.866 -0.68% 0.764 
21 2.04% 2.255 0.83% 2.402 
22 1.85% 2.146 0.12% 0.4 
23 0.29% -0.226 -0.01% 0.218 
24 -6.19% -2.302 0.04% -1.056 
25 -3.60% -1.032 0.10% -1.056 
26 -0.76% -1.029 0.00% 1.856 
27 1.65% 1.771 -0.35% -0.874 
28 1.60% 2.601 0.35% 1.492 
29 2.23% 1.497 0.16% -0.146 
30 1.65% 3.233 -0.70% -1.784 
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Figure 1: Abnormal returns related to carve-out announcement 
 
Day relative to carve-out announcement during expansion and recession. 
 
 
Figure 2: Abnormal returns related to carve-out announcement 
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I partition the carveout sample in two type of industry: High tech industry firms and non-
high-tech industry firms. In table 8, panel A and B, I compare the cumulative abnormal returns 
of High tech industry firms and non-high tech industry firms when the economy is in expansion 
or recession. Table 9 shows standardized abnormal and along with relevant test statistics, 
associated with the 44 high-tech carve-outs announcements during expansion and 2 high-tech 
carve-outs announcement during recession and 77 non- high-tech carve-outs announcements 
during expansion and 3 non- high-tech carve-outs announcement during recession. My results 
are depicted in figure 2 and suggest that carve-outs announcements are associated with positive 
abnormal returns in the period preceding the announcement. My results confirm that abnormal 
returns are higher in recession than in expansion. Adverse selection theory related to carve-outs 
is then verified. Cumulative abnormal returns are different from 0 using different event window 
and hypothesis 2 is verified. 
Table 8: Analysis of cumulative abnormal returns across periods of the macroeconomic 
according to industry sectors 
Panel A: CAAR for high-tech firms carve outs    
(-1,0) 0.86** 3.86*** 3 
(1.703) (4.763) 
    
(0,1) 1.21** 0.50 -0.71 
(1.749) (0.244) 
    
(-1,1) 2.18*** 3.25*** 1.07 
(2.369) (2.618) 
    
0 -0.11 1.10* 1.21 
(0.826) (1.319) 
 
Panel B: CAAR for non- high-tech firms carve outs    
(-1,0) 0.61 7.02*** 6.41 
(1.262) (1.790) 
    
(0,1) 0.30* 4.62** 4.32 
(0.979) (4.419) 
    
(-1,1) 0.46 8.24** 7.78 
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(0.837) (1.979) 
    
0 0.44* 3.40*** 2.96 
(1.303) (5.186) 
The sample consist of carve outs completed during 1982-2010 by USA industrial firms. The table presents 
cumulative abnormal returns and univariate analysis of the abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are calculated 
using market adjusted model parameters estimated over 255 days ending 46 days before the filing of the carve out. 
The CRSP value weighted index is used in the market model to compute betas. In panel A,CAAR are presented over 
several event windows. Standardized cross sectional test which is an extension of the Patel test is noted in 
parenthesis. The asterisk *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels 
 
 
 
Table 9: Abnormal returns across periods of the macroeconomic according to industry 
sectors 
 
Event dates 
AR high-tech 
in recession 
AR high-tech in 
Expansion 
AR non-high-tech in 
Expansion 
AR non-high-tech in 
recession 
-10 0.26% -0.52% -0.27% 1.54% 
-9 -0.68% -0.47% 0.29% 1.58% 
-8 9.06% -1.58% 0.00% 0.91% 
-7 5.13% -0.21% 0.33% 4.19% 
-6 -0.81% -0.38% -0.29% 5.29% 
-5 1.63% -0.49% -0.12% -1.07% 
-4 0.06% -0.58% 0.03% -1.69% 
-3 -0.77% -1.11% 0.17% -0.40% 
-2 3.82% 0.00% 0.66% -0.09% 
-1 2.76% 0.97% 0.16% 3.62% 
0 1.10% -0.11% 0.44% 3.40% 
1 -0.60% 1.32% -0.15% 1.22% 
2 -1.32% 0.95% 0.18% 1.73% 
3 3.93% 0.60% 0.14% -1.66% 
4 -0.41% 3.14% -0.36% 3.91% 
5 0.53% -0.09% -0.07% -1.50% 
6 -6.17% 0.63% 0.94% -2.13% 
7 -0.12% -0.85% -0.31% 3.61% 
8 -3.56% -1.17% -0.02% -0.02% 
9 -0.06% -0.45% 0.73% -2.37% 
10 -4.26% 0.20% 1.07% 1.42% 
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Figure 2: Abnormal returns related to carve-out announcement for the different 
type of industry: High-tech industry firms and non-high tech industry firms 
 
Table 10 shows event study results for 126 carve-outs announcements given their type of 
industry sector. My results suggest that high-tech carve-outs announcements and non-high-tech 
carve-outs are associated with weak positive abnormal returns in the period of expansion. 
Moreover, the abnormal returns for high-tech industry firms are lower than the abnormal returns 
for non-high-tech industry firms. It supports previous empirical studies (Jung, Kimand slutz, 
1996)17. However, the difference of abnormal return is not statistically significant. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Companies with most valuable investment opportunities do not experience significant abnormal return when they 
issue equity. 
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Table 10 Analysis of cumulative abnormal returns across industry type 
Event window Mean (%) 
(for high-tech firms carve 
outs) 
Mean (%) 
(for non-high-tech firms 
carve outs) 
Difference 
    
(-1,0) 0.99*** 0.85 0.14 
(1.868) (1.433)  
    
(0,1) 1.18** 0.46** 0.72 
(0.038) (1.141)  
    
(-1,1) 2.22** 0.75 1.47 
(2.501) (1.086)  
    
0 -0.066*** 0.55** -0.616 
(0.891) (1.399)  
The sample size for high tech 46, for non-high-tech * p value in parenthesis. Significant at the 10% level, 
* *Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level 
Table 11 test the significance of the difference between CAARs in recession and 
expansion and the difference between CAARs for the different types of industry sectors. The 
results indicate that the differences in CAARs due to economic cycles are different from zeros 
and are significant. However, the difference of cumulative abnormal average returns due to 
industry type sectors is not statistically significant. 
Table 11: t-test 
 Mean of CAAR for all event 
window (%) 
(Expansion) 
Mean of CAAR for all 
event window (%) 
(Recession) 
T stat for difference 
between Expansion and 
Recession 
    
All carve outs 0.6625 4.365 -4.86*** 
(p=0.008) 
    
High tech industry 1.035 2.1775 -1.21 
(p=0.27) 
    
Non high-tech industry 0.4525 5.82 5.17*** 
(p=0.003) 
* Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level
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In this section I also study the impact firm specific and economic variable on abnormal 
returns using the OLS regression. The objective of this analysis is to examine whether economic 
wide variation in carve-out issuing has a direct impact on abnormal return. The results are 
presented in table 12. The dependent variable is the abnormal returns in the event window (0,+1). 
Table 12: Regression related to economy-wide, firm-specific, the abnormal returns at carve-out issue. 
 Regression1:Abnormal returns 
 
 
Regression2:Abnormal returns 
 
 
Regression3: Abnormal returns 
Intercept 0.154* 0.14 0.038 
(0.074) (.089) (0.575) 
Growth 
opportunities 
-0.021*** -.001 0.023* 
(0.007) (.002) (0.10) 
Leverage -0.018 -.022 0.459 
(0.087) (.100) (0.491) 
Size -0.007 -.002 -0.005 
(0.007) (.007) (0.537) 
Interest rate 0.005 .005 0.0002 
(0.01) (.011) (0.983) 
GNP -0.021*** -0.026*** - 
(0.010) (.01)  
Market 
Anticipation 
0.132 -0.151 -0.129 
(0.328) (0.151) (0.388) 
Growth 
opportunities*GNP 
- - -0.005* 
   (0.086) 
Leverage*GNP - - -0.073 
   (0.474) 
Regression 1: Robust regression analysis provides an alternative to a least squares regression model when 
fundamental assumptions are unfulfilled by the nature of the data. 
Regression 2: OLS regression 
Regression 3: OLS regression using interaction variables 
Note: This table reports regressions 1, 2 and 3’s coefficients with p-values in parenthesis. The asterisk *, **, and 
*** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels. 
 
In regression 1 I estimate the abnormal returns equation with controlling for market 
expectation using a robust regression. In regression 2 I use the OLS regression and probabilities 
of recession is used as a control variable for market expectation. In regression 3 I include 
interactions of firm specific variables with economy wide factor to measure the differential 
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impact of Tobin’s Q across different periods of economy –wide factor. The results from equation 
1-3 are consistent with previous literature. GNP is significant suggesting that this economy wide 
variable affect the abnormal return around carve out announcement. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigate the relation between the economic cycle and carve-outs 
cumulative average abnormal returns and analyze the impact of economic variables on firms’ 
abnormal returns. Using the announcement period abnormal returns as a measure of carve-outs 
outcome, I study whether expansion and contraction or economic growth cause variation in 
abnormal returns obtained when firms issue carve-out. 
I document a significant positive stock price reaction to carve-out issues during the 
period 1982-2009. I find that around carve-out announcement, there is a significant difference 
between abnormal returns during expansion and abnormal returns during recession. The higher 
abnormal return during recession is due to the higher level of adverse selection during that 
period. I also find there are more carve outs during expansion than recession and the results 
support previous several empirical studies18 and the theory of adverse selection and market 
timing. 
OLS regression that include firm specific factors and economic wide factors which 
capture variation in carve-outs abnormal returns indicate that economic growth rate proxied by 
GNP directly affect the abnormal returns. 
In addition the relation between carve-out’s return and industry type has been 
investigated. I found that high-tech industries that undertake carve out have better positive 
abnormal return than non-high-tech industries. However this difference is not significant. This 
                                                 
18
 Lowry and Schwert (2002); George K Yarrow, Piotr Jasinski (1996); Hand and Skantz (1997b) Marsh (1982) and 
Taggart (1977)) 
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study also show that within a same industry sector, carve out abnormal returns are impacted by 
the economy cycle. 
The results in this dissertation highlight the importance of economic cycle on firms’ 
carve-outs outcome. Economic environment impact adverse selection and firms’ growth 
opportunities and therefore has a significant effect on firms’ abnormal returns and choice to 
divest through carveout. 
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